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This paper analyzes trade between ￿rms that are heterogeneous in product quality in a
simple general equilibrium model. The multi-sided heterogeneity of exporters and importers
creates a new source of gains from trade. The opening of trade raises the quality of ￿nal goods
by improving matching of ￿rms. The quality upgrading is decomposed as the short run e⁄ect of
a reduction in the quality gap among parts and components and the long run e⁄ect of intensi￿ed
competition among suppliers. Under the existence of ￿xed trade costs, ￿rms￿trade pattern is
consistent with a variety of stylized facts that have not been explained in the conventional love
of variety model. Firms selectively trade with those with similar sizes at similar quality levels.
Both exporting and importing are concentrated into large and high quality ￿rms, though not
all large and high quality ￿rms engage in trade. Trade in intermediate goods improves the
quality of even ￿rms that do not import intermediate goods.
Key Words: matching, heterogeneous ￿rms, quality, vertical di⁄erentiation, trade in inter-
mediate goods, o⁄shoring.
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11 Introduction
Trade in intermediate goods has been becoming an important source of welfare gains from the
globalization. A signi￿cant amount of traded products are intermediate goods and their share in
the total volume is rapidly growing.1 In addition to traditional consumer￿ s gains from trade such
as the availability of more varieties in cheaper prices, trade in intermediate goods improves the
quality/productivity of ￿nal good producers.2
A new feature of the recent trade in intermediate goods is that ￿rms often form international
production teams. Thanks to the development in communication and transportation technologies,
￿rms in distant countries cooperatively develop a product and trade specially designed parts and
components within a team. Boeing 787 dreamliner is a good example. For this new midsize jet,
Boeing sets up a team that consists of 43 suppliers mostly selected from developed countries.3
The suppliers, which Boeing proudly calls ￿the world￿ s most capable top-tier supplier partners￿ ,
produce cutting-edge components newly designed for this airplane. Similar team production of
high-tech ￿rms in developed countries is observed in other quality-di⁄erentiated products such as
automobiles and electronics.4
The international team production suggests a new channel though which international trade
a⁄ects the quality of ￿nal products. It is well-known that there is a considerable degree of het-
erogeneity in ￿rms￿performances within industry. Furthermore, empirical works on price data
suggest the observed ￿rm-heterogeneity re￿ ects the di⁄erence in product quality.5 Given this
1For instance, according to Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2005), imports by good/service producers, most of
which are likely to be intermediate goods for domestic production, account for 70% of total imports in the US in
2000, while imports by wholesalers/retailers account for only 27%. Feenstra (1998) surveys evidence for a growing
importance for trade in intermediate goods.
2Broda, Green￿eld, and Weinstein (2006) report the aggregate gains in total factor productivity (TFP) from
trade in intermediate goods account for 15% of TFP growth in a typical country.
3For the list of suppliers, see http://www.boeing.com/commercial/787family/background.html.
4Another famous example is Apple ipod. Though products are assembled and exported from China, more than
90% of the gross pro￿ts of Apple￿ s iPod are taken by US and Japanese ￿rms producing cutting-edge components
(Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick, 2007).
5Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow (2005) are two early studies on the heterogeneity of unit prices of
traded goods within product categories. Hummels and Skiba (2004), Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), Johnson (2008),
and Bernard et al. (2007) observe fob price of traded goods increases in the distance and trade costs, which implies
￿rms producing higher quality products are more likely to be exported. From plant data, Kugler and Verhoogen
2prevalence in the heterogeneity of ￿rms in product quality, matching of team members determines
the combination of the quality of parts and components and the quality of ￿nished products.
Although recent empirical studies emphasize the prevalence of heterogeneity of exporting ￿rms,
importing ￿rms, and product quality, the matching of heterogeneous ￿rms is understudied in
the literature. Existing models of trade by heterogeneous ￿rms abstract away from matching of
￿rms. Most studies (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Kasahara and Lapham, 2008) employ the love of variety
(Krugman, 1980; Ethier, 1982) as a source of gains from trade, which automatically implies that
all importers trade with all exporters.6 Existing models of matching of ￿rms focus on a random
matching between symmetric ￿rms rather than heterogeneous ￿rms (Casella and Rauch, 2001;
Rauch and Casella, 2003; Rauch and Trindade, 2003; Grossman and Helpman, 2005). However,
casual observations and some empirical study suggest that the matching of ￿rms is assortative in
quality rather than purely random. For instance, parts and components for luxury cars are usually
higher quality than those for standard cars. Furthermore, from the price data of Colombian plants,
Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) found plants using expensive imported inputs tend to use expensive
domestic inputs. The conventional love of variety model and random matching model fail to
analyze these systematic patterns in transactions of intermediate goods.
To ￿ll this gap in the literature, this paper develops a tractable general equilibrium model
of international team production of quality di⁄erentiated ￿rms. Ex ante symmetric ￿rms become
heterogeneous in product quality as a result of R&D investment as a quality-version of Melitz (2003)
model developed by Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), Johnson (2008), and Kugler and Verhoogen
(2008). Firms form production teams in a competitive matching market as in Becker (1973) and
Sattinger (1979). Team members complement with each other in developing the quality of ￿nal
products. Consumers prefer a moderate combination of the quality of parts and components. As
the simplest model of trade between developed countries, I consider two symmetric countries that
di⁄er in their R&D technologies.
The model presents a new mechanism of ￿rm-level gains from trade. International trade in
intermediate goods, i.e. international matching of ￿rms, raises the quality of ￿nal goods by im-
proving matching of ￿rms within a team. In the autarky, matching patterns di⁄er across countries
(2007) ￿nd exporting plants tend to have a higher index of output prices.
6Bernard et al. (2003) use the perfectly competitive model instead of the love of variety model. However, ￿rms
do not care about their trading partners under the perfect competition.
3re￿ ecting the di⁄erence in their technologies. In the short run after the opening of trade, the
matching pattern converges across countries. This reduces the di⁄erence in the quality among
parts and components to improve the quality of ￿nal goods. In the long run, countries￿specializa-
tion in low entry cost sectors increases competition among suppliers to raise the quality of suppliers
available for ￿nal producers.
Combined with ￿xed trade costs, the pattern of ￿rm-level trade based on this new gain is
consistent with a variety of stylized facts, some of which are di¢ cult to explain in the conventional
love of variety model. First of all, ￿rms selectively trade with those with similar characteristics
instead of trading with all ￿rms. Second, both exporting and importing are concentrated into
a small share of large and high quality ￿rms within industries.7 Furthermore, the assortative
matching explains why exporting ￿rms and importing ￿rms are larger in common characteristics
than non-trading ￿rms as observed by Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2005) and Kasahara and
Lapham (2008). Third, not all large and high quality ￿rms necessarily trade. While in the love
of variety model, the most productive ￿rms always choose to trade, in the current model, some
portion of high quality ￿rms always choose not to trade.8 Finally, trade upgrades the quality of
￿nal producers that do not import intermediate goods. In the conventional model of trade in
intermediate goods such as the love of variety model and the quality-ladder model, ￿rms must
import foreign intermediate goods in order to raise the productivity/quality. This last prediction
is consistent with a recent ￿nding by Amiti and Konings (2007) that a reduction in tari⁄s on
intermediate goods improves the total factor productivity (TFP) of even ￿rms that do not use
imported intermediate goods.
The paper contributes to the literature of so-called heterogeneous ￿rm trade theories. Many
theories have been developed to analyze exporters heterogeneous in productivity (Bernard, Jensen,
Eaton, and Kortum, 2003; Melitz, 2003), exporters heterogeneous in product quality (Baldwin and
Harrigan, 2007; Johnson, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2008; Verhoogen, 2008), and heterogeneous
7Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007) survey empirical and theoretical studies on ￿rm-level trade. See
Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) and the papers cited in Bernard et al. (2007)
for the concentration of exporting. See Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007), Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2005), Biscourp and Kramarz (2007), and Kasahara and Lapham (2007) for the concentrantion of importing.
8In the Ricardian model by Bernard et al. (2003), it is possible for the most productive ￿rm to choose not to
export because the high productivity does not assure the comparative advantage. However, their model has no
heterogeneous importers.
4importers (Antr￿s and Helpman, 2003; Kasahara and Lapham, 2008). However, these studies treat
heterogeneous exporters and importers in separate frameworks. The paper o⁄ers the ￿rst model
of trade between ￿rms that are heterogeneous in product quality.
The paper relies on the long history of the matching literature developed by Gale and Shapley
(1962), Becker (1973), and other many studies. Especially, my model applies Sattinger (1979)￿ s
model of a continuum of agents. My innovation is to let the distribution of ￿rms at each side of
matching endogenously determined, which allows me to analyze the e⁄ect of trade liberalization
on the distribution of ￿rms across industries in a general equilibrium framework.
The paper is closely related with recent studies on international matching of heterogeneous
agents.9 Kremer and Maskin (2006) and Antr￿s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) study
North-South matching of workers based on a hierarchical order in the skill intensity of production
stages. My paper considers matching of ￿rms between developed countries and does not assume
any hierarchical order in the characteristics of production stages. Furthermore, their models allow
workers to move across production stages, but my model prohibits ￿rms from moving across
production stages. This last point leads to very di⁄erent predictions on the distribution of gains
from trade across agents. In Antr￿s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), the most skilled
managers always reduce team￿ s size and output by being matched with less skilled workers after
the opening of trade, while in my model, the highest quality ￿nal producers improve the output
from better matching. Nocke and Yeaple (2008) analyze two-sided matching between a corporate
asset and a manager to model international M&A. The current paper analyzes three-sided matching
and introduces a richer structure of ￿rms￿entry and exit to derive systematic predictions on the
pattern of international matching. Furthermore, none of the above three studies analyzes costs of
international matching.
The theoretical literature of trade in vertically-di⁄erentiated goods has focused on North-South
trade in ￿nal goods, e.g. Flam and Helpman (1987). The literature has also been interested in
whether low wage allows developing countries to export low quality products, e.g. Murphy and
Shleifer (1997) and Sutton (2007). The current paper complements the literature by o⁄ering a
9A matching model is also becoming a popular tool to study trade between countries with di⁄erent distributions
of workers￿skill. Grossman and Maggi (2000) model domestic matching between heterogeneous workers. Ohnsornge
and Tre￿ er (2007), Costinot (2008), and Costinot and Vogel (2008) study domestic matching between heterogeneous
workers and di⁄erent industries.
5model of trade in vertically di⁄erentiated intermediate goods between countries at a similar income
level.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of a closed economy.
Section 3 analyzes trade between symmetric countries. Section 4 concludes the paper and remarks
on future extensions.
2 Closed Economy
This section introduces a general equilibrium model of team production in a closed economy setting.
I explain the basic structure of the model and then demonstrate that the distribution of ￿rms and
matching patterns of ￿rms re￿ ect the technology of the economy.
2.1 Basic Structure
Consider a closed economy endowed with one production factor, labor. Final goods are both









where ￿ is the set of available varieties of ￿nal goods, ! is a particular variety, c(!) is consumption
of variety !, q(!) is product quality of !, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is a parameter. Let p(!) be a price of !










is a quality-adjusted price index. The product quality q (!) is a demand shifter: a higher q implies
a larger demand at a given price.
There exist three types of ￿rms: ￿nal producers in ￿nal goods sector, suppliers of intermediate
good Z1 (Z1-suppliers) in Z1-sector, and suppliers of intermediate good Z2 (Z2-suppliers) in Z2-
sector. A ￿nal producer, a Z1-supplier, and a Z2-supplier form a production team to produce
one variety of ￿nal good. Intermediate goods are specially designed for a particular variety of
￿nal good, e.g. engines and bodies for a particular model of car; therefore, ￿rms transact them
6only within a team. In the following, I use subscripts i and j to denote variables and functions of
Z1-suppliers and Z2-suppliers. They always mean that i;j 2 f1;2g and i 6= j when i and j are
used together.
Firms are continuum and heterogeneous in production quality. Let x, z1, and z2 be the quality
parameters of ￿nal producers, Z1-suppliers, and Z2-suppliers, respectively.10 Quality parameters
can also be interpreted as the quality of components, or product characteristics in a terminology
used in the industrial organization literature.
The quality of a ￿nal good depends on the quality of team members in the following simple
way,
q = xz1z2: (1)
The function (1) exhibits three properties. First, q is increasing as is normally expected. Second,
q is supermodular. A smooth twice-di⁄erentiable function is called (strictly) supermodular if all of
its partial cross-derivatives are positive. The supermodularity expresses complementarity among
the quality of team members. Suppose a car production team replaces an engine with the one with
higher quality. The supermodularity just requires the improvement in the overall car performance
to be increasing in the quality of the other parts and components such as transmission, body, tires,
etc. Finally, q is quasi-concave. Consumers prefer a moderate combination of the quality of parts
and components to an extreme combination. For instance, consumers might prefer a standard-class
car with normal equipment to a luxury-class car with a poor air conditioner.
The labor market is perfectly competitive and wage is normalized as one. When a team
produces X unit of a ￿nal good of quality q, the ￿nal producer requires LX(q;X) unit of labor,
X unit of intermediate goods Z1, and X unit of intermediate goods Z2. To produce X unit of
intermediate goods Zi designed for ￿nal goods with quality q, each Zi-supplier requires LZi(q;X)
unit of labor. The labor requirement is symmetric across team members, consists of ￿xed and




for h = X;Z1;and Z2: (2)
The assumption in (2) that variable costs increase in the quality of ￿nal goods re￿ ects costs
of quality control in team production. Since even one defect component can destroy the whole
10Readers may call x;z1;and z2 ￿productivity￿of quality production.
7product, as emphasized by Kremer (1993), production of high quality ￿nal goods requires extra
costs of quality control for all team members. The ￿xed cost f includes costs of participating in
the matching market as well as physical production costs.
The ￿rm heterogeneity arises from ￿rms￿entry and exit. There exist in￿nitely many potential
entrants of ￿nal producers and Zi-suppliers. These ￿rms are ex ante symmetric, but become
heterogeneous as a result of uncertain R&D investment. When ￿rms enter, each ￿rm independently
draws its quality parameter from a common Pareto distribution.11 The distribution function is
G(s) ￿ 1￿s￿k for s 2 [1;1) where k > 3 is assumed to assure the existence of ￿nite GDP. Entry
requires fXe unit of labor for ￿nal producers and fZie unit of labor for Zi-suppliers. These entry
costs include not only setup costs but also R&D investment for blueprint of products. Firms are
risk neutral so that they enter until their expected pro￿ts are zero.
After knowing quality parameters, ￿rms form production teams. The matching of ￿rms is
frictionless in the following two senses: (i) ￿rms have all information about the other ￿rms and (ii)
￿rms can write a complete contract on the distribution of team￿ s joint pro￿t.12 For mathematical
tractability, I assume one-to-one matching, i.e. each ￿rm can join at most one team.13
The model consists of four stages. (i) Pre-entry Stage: a Walrasian auctioneer announces wage
to clear the labor market. (ii) Entry Stage: ￿rms enter and draw quality parameters by paying
￿xed entry costs. (iii) Matching Stage: ￿rms form production teams. (iv) Production Stage: teams
compete in a ￿nal good market under the monopolistic competition and distribute the joint pro￿t.
11The Pareto distribution is commonly used to characterize empirical distributions of ￿rm size. See Axtell (2001)
and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), for example. In the current model, the sales of ￿nal goods follow the
Pareto distributions both in autarky and free trade.
12The latter assumption abstracts away from a problem whether a team is formed within or across the boundaries
of ￿rms.
13The assumption of ￿one-to-one￿is not necessary here. The main results are derived from the assorative matching
of ￿rms. A crucial assumption for the assortative matching is that each Zi-supplier has a capacity constraint on the
number of teams that they can join. There are also several theoretical reasons for this capacity constraint: search
costs convex in the number of buyers, convex marketing costs (Arkolakis, 2008), and several reasons for vertical
foreclosure discussed in the industrial organization literature. I leave incorporating one of these reasons in the model
for future research.
82.2 Equilibrium
I derive an equilibrium allocation by backward induction. Although the model has a trivial equi-
librium where no ￿rm enters, I focus on an equilibrium with entry.
Production Stage Consider a team producing a ￿nal good with quality q. Since team￿ s marginal
cost is q, it follows that the optimal price p(q) of ￿nal goods, the sales r(q) of ￿nal goods, and




, r(q) = I (P￿)
￿￿1 q, and ￿(q) = Aq ￿ f. (3)
Parameter A ￿ ￿￿1I (￿P)
￿￿1 expresses the market condition exogenous to individual teams. The
optimal output, ￿ c = ￿￿IP￿￿1, is independent of q. This is because both consumer￿ s demand and
marginal costs increase in q and the two e⁄ects are balanced under the current speci￿cation. Since
the price increases in q, both revenue and pro￿t increase in q. From (1) and (3), team￿ s joint pro￿t
is increasing and supermodular in the quality of team members,
￿(x;z1;z2) = Axz1z2 ￿ f. (4)
Matching Stage Firms choose their partners and decide the distribution of team￿ s joint pro￿t,
taking A as given. Two types of functions, pro￿t schedules, ￿X (x) and ￿Zi (zi), and assignment
functions, mZi (x), characterize equilibrium matching. A ￿nal producer with quality x chooses
Zi-suppliers with quality mZi (x) and receives a residual pro￿t ￿X (x) after paying pro￿ts ￿Zi (zi)
for Zi-suppliers. Firms can also choose not to join any team and exit. Following the matching
literature, I focus on stable matching satisfying two conditions: (i) no individual ￿rm is willing to
deviate from the current team; (ii) no trio of a ￿nal producer, a Z1-supplier, and a Z2-supplier
are willing to deviate from the current teams to form a new team.14 The two conditions require
the following two conditions, respectively: (i) all ￿rms earn non-negative pro￿t, ￿X (x) ￿ 0 and
14The ￿rst condition is often called individual rationality and the second condition is pair-wise stability. Roth and
Sotomayer (1990) is an excellent textbook on the literature.
9￿Zi (zi) ￿ 0 for all x and zi; (ii) each ￿rm in a team is the optimal partner for the other members,
￿X (x) = ￿(x;mZ1 (x);mZ2 (x)) ￿ ￿Z1(mZ1 (x)) ￿ ￿Z2(mZ2 (x))
= max
z1;z2
￿(x;z1;z2) ￿ ￿Z1(z1) ￿ ￿Z2(z2) and (5)







￿ ￿X(x0) ￿ ￿Zj(zj). (6)
The ￿rst order conditions for maximization (5) and (6),
￿0
X (x) = AmZ1(x)mZ2 (x) and ￿0
Zi(mZi (x)) = AxmZj (x); (7)
prove that pro￿t schedules increase in quality parameters.
From the supermodularity of joint pro￿t in (4), ￿rms are assortatively matched according to
their quality as in Becker (1973) and Sattinger (1979). The logic is straightforward. Since a high
quality ￿rm has a higher willingness to pay for extra quality of partners, a high quality ￿rm is
matched with a high quality ￿rm in a stable matching.
Lemma 1 (Assortative matching) mZi(x) ￿ mZi(x0) if only if x ￿ x0.
Proof. In Appendix.
The assortative matching in Lemma 1 predicts a systematic pattern on the combination of the
quality of parts and components. It implies that more expensive ￿nal goods have higher quality
in all parts and components than less expensive ￿nal goods. This complementarity of quality of
components is quite common for many quality-di⁄erentiated goods, such as cars, electronics, and
clothing. In the literature of hedonic regression, this complementarity is often observed as multi-
collinearity (see e.g. Triplet, 2004). Furthermore, Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) found Colombian
manufacturing plants using expensive foreign inputs tend to use expensive domestic inputs, while
plants using cheap foreign inputs tend to use cheap domestic inputs. If observed prices are proxy
for product quality, which will be shown to hold in this model, the assortative matching by product
quality is consistent with their ￿nding.
Fixed costs f allow only teams producing high quality ￿nal goods to survive. Under assortative
matching, teams producing the lowest quality, which consist of the lowest quality ￿rms, must be
break even
￿(xL;z1L;z2L) = AxLz1Lz2L ￿ f = 0; (8)
10where xL and ziL are the lowest quality thresholds of ￿nal producers and Z1-suppliers, respectively,
and satisfy
￿X(xL) = ￿Z1(z1L) = ￿Z2(z2L) = 0: (9)
Firms with lower quality than the lowest quality thresholds choose not to join teams and exit.
Assignment functions must clear the demand and supply for ￿rms in the matching market. Let
MXe, MZ1e, and MZ2e be the mass of entrants of ￿nal producers, Z1-suppliers, and Z2-suppliers,
respectively. Under assortative matching, the market clearing condition is written as
MXe [1 ￿ G(x)] = MZie [1 ￿ G(mZi (x))] for all x ￿ xL: (10)
The left hand side of (10) is the mass of ￿nal producers with higher quality than x. The right
hand side is the mass of Zi-suppliers matched with those ￿nal producers. They must be equal
for all x of survival ￿nal producers. Figure 1 describes the market clearing conditions (10) in the
matching market. Bars in Figures 1 express the distributions of ￿nal producers, Z1-suppliers, and
Z2-suppliers. The vertical axis draws values of the distribution G(x), G(z1), and G(z2) in a range
of [0;1]. The areas of rectangles surrounded by solid lines are equal to the mass of survival ￿rms,
MXe [1 ￿ G(xL)] and MZie [1 ￿ G(ziL)], respectively, each of which must have the same area under
one-to-one matching. Grey areas, which are equal to MXe [1 ￿ G(x)] and MZie [1 ￿ G(mZi (x))],
respectively, must have the same area from (10).
The relative mass of entrants across sectors determines the matching pattern. Under the Pareto
distribution, assignment functions are solved from (10),





for all x ￿ xL. (11)
Figure 2 draws mZi (x) for a given x as an increasing and concave curve in the relative mass of
entrants. Figure 3 explains the intuition. As more ￿rms enter Zi-sector, a ￿nal producer becomes
matched with a Zi-supplier with better quality. Suppose new Zi-suppliers with mass dM0
Zie enter.
A ￿nal producer with quality x can be matched with better Zi-suppliers only if new entrants have
higher quality than the current partner. Under the Pareto distribution, the mass of those high
quality Zi-suppliers [1 ￿ G(mZi (x))]dMZie falls as mZi (x) rises further by dM00
Zie; therefore, the
marginal improvement is diminishing.15
15This concave relationship holds under a wide class of distributions including those exhibiting the non-decreasing
hazard rate g(x)=(1 ￿ G(x)), which includes uniform, normal, exponential, and other frequently used distributions.










for all x ￿ xL and zi ￿ ziL. Pro￿ts are increasing in the market size A, the quality parameters of
the partners, and the degree of its advantage in quality over the lowest quality ￿rm. The cuto⁄




















for all x ￿ xL and zi ￿ ziL.16 The pro￿t schedule is decreasing in the lowest quality threshold
because of two negative e⁄ects. When the threshold increases, ￿rms in that sector become assigned
with lower quality partners (see (11)) and the market size A shrinks (see (8)).17
Entry Stage Since ￿rms are ex ante identical and risk neutral, their expected pro￿ts must be
equal to entry costs,
[1 ￿ G(xL)] ￿ ￿X = fXe and [1 ￿ G(ziL)] ￿ ￿Zi = fZie; (14)
where ￿ ￿X and ￿ ￿Zi are the average pro￿ts of ￿rms in the market, ￿ ￿X = [1 ￿ G(xL)]
￿1 R 1
xL ￿X (t)g (t)dt
and ￿ ￿Zi = [1 ￿ G(ziL)]
￿1 R 1
ziL ￿Zi (t)g (t)dt: A straightforward manipulation from (13) proves that
the average pro￿ts turn are constant,




This constant average pro￿t is consistent with a well-known property of the Melitz-type model
(2003) that the average pro￿t of ￿rms becomes constant when ￿rms￿productivity follows the
Pareto distribution. In the current model, teams￿quality q follows the Pareto distribution.18 To
16To derive (13), I use mZi (x) = x(ziL=xL) derived from (10).
17The pro￿t schedules in (13) are independent of the quality thresholds in the other sectors because of the
consequence of two opposite e⁄ects. When the threshold increases in the other sectors, the ￿rm becomes assigned
with better partners, but the other rival ￿rms in the same sector enjoy that improvement, which reduces the market
size A for individual ￿rms. These two e⁄ects are cancelled under the Pareto distribution.
18The distribution of q is Pr(q ￿ s) = 1 ￿ (qL=s)
k=3, where qL ￿ xLz1Lz2L is the lowest quality of ￿nal goods in
the market.
12assure the positive mass of entry, I assume f=(k ￿ 3) ￿ maxffXe;fZieg. Then, the lowest quality









fZie (k ￿ 3)
￿1=k
. (16)
The lowest thresholds decrease in entry costs and increases in production ￿xed costs. The intuition
will be clear below after I solve the mass of consumption varieties, M, and the mass of entrants
in each sector.
Since ￿rms earn zero expected pro￿ts, the aggregate revenue from ￿nal goods must be equal
to the aggregate labor income, M￿ r = ￿ L, where ￿ r is the average revenue of survival teams. From
￿ r = ￿ (￿ ￿X + ￿ ￿Z1 + ￿ ￿Z2 + f) and (15), the mass of consumption varieties is proportional to the








Under one-to-one matching, the mass of teams is equal to the mass of survival ￿rms in each sector.














While the relative magnitude of labor endowment to production ￿xed costs determine the mass
of varieties consumed, the relative size of entry costs determines the relative size of the mass of
entrants.
The lowest quality thresholds in (16) link the mass of consumption varieties and the mass of
entrants. Lower entry costs attract relatively more entrants, but the total mass of survival ￿rms
(17) is independent of the size of entry costs. Therefore, in the sector with low entry costs, ￿rms
have to be higher quality to survive than in the other sectors.

















for all x ￿ xL.
A component produced by a sector with relatively lower entry costs is relatively higher quality
than the other components. Although our main interest is in an open economy, the closed economy
model predicts horizontal di⁄erences in the quality of parts and components. National product
13di⁄erentiation is often loosely stated in terms of horizontal di⁄erences in the quality of components,
e.g. ￿European cars have safety bodies￿or ￿Japanese cars are energy e¢ cient￿ , even though the
most expensive Japanese cars will be safer than the cheapest European cars. In this model, this
kind of comparison is valid when ￿nal goods with the same price are compared.
3 Open Economy
In this section, I extend the model in a two-country framework and analyze the e⁄ect of trade
intermediate goods, i.e. international matching, on the matching patterns and the quality of ￿nal
goods. Throughout this paper, I assume that ￿nal goods are non-tradable.19
3.1 Symmetric Two Countries
I consider two symmetric countries, Home and Foreign, which are identical except entry costs in
the Zi-sectors. Foreign is a mirror image of Home: Foreign Z1-sector is identical to Home Z2-
sector, while Foreign Z2-sector is identical to Home Z1-sector. Without loss of generality, Home
Z1-sector and Foreign Z2-sector require smaller entry costs than the other sectors,
fZ1e = f￿
Z2e < fZ2e = f￿
Z1e, (18)
where foreign variables and functions are labeled by asterisks. I call Home Z1-sector and Foreign
Z2-sector Low Entry Cost (LEC) sectors and Home Z1-sector and Foreign Z2-sector High Entry
Cost (HEC) sectors.
The symmetric model tries to capture trade in quality-di⁄erentiated intermediate goods be-
tween developed countries at similar income level. Furthermore, the mirror-image structure greatly
simpli￿es the analysis. Wage is equalized across countries and normalized as one. Equilibrium
values of functions and variables of Home Zi-sector are the same as those of Foreign Zj-sector.
The other aspects are identical between Home and Foreign.
The horizontal di⁄erence in entry costs creates a horizontal di⁄erence in the autarky matching
patterns. Final producers with quality x produce the same quality of ￿nal goods in both countries,
but in the teams, Zi-suppliers from LEC-sectors are higher quality than Zj-suppliers from HEC-
19Since the structure of the ￿nal good market is similar to the Melitz (2003) model, introducing trade in ￿nal
goods will add few new insight.
14sectors. Point A and Point A* in Figure 4 represent the quality of Zi-suppliers in a Home team
(ma
Z1 (x);ma
Z2 (x)) and in a Foreign team (m￿a
Z1 (x);m￿a
Z2 (x)), respectively, for given x. The curve
in Figure 4 is an ￿iso-q (x) curve,￿which depicts a combination of the quality of Zi-suppliers in
that ￿nal producers with quality x need to produce ￿nal goods with quality q(x). In the following,
endogenous variables and functions in the autarky equilibrium are labeled by ￿a￿ .
3.2 Trade Costs and Specialization
The opening of trade in intermediate goods allows international matching of ￿rms between the two
countries. Forming international teams requires ￿xed trade costs, which include transportation
costs, communication costs, and costs of adopting foreign standards and regulations, etc. If an
international team has n foreign suppliers, then the team must hire nfI unit of labor as ￿xed trade
costs. Each ￿rm in an international team equally shares nfI by hiring nfI=3 unit of labor. From
the symmetric structure, I will show that n ￿ 1 holds in equilibrium. For simplicity, I assume that
trade does not require any variable cost.
Three regimes arise depending on the level of fI: autarky, incomplete specialization, and
complete specialization.
Lemma 2 There exists a threshold level of trade costs ~ fI: (i) (autarky) if fI = 1, then no
international matching occurs; (ii) (incomplete specialization) if ~ fI < fI < 1, then both countries
have positive mass of entrants in all three sectors; (iii) (complete specialization) if fI < ~ fI, then
both countries have positive mass of entrants in ￿nal goods sector and LEC sector, but no entrant
in HEC sector.
Proof. In Appendix.
As I will show below, in the incomplete specialization equilibrium, international teams and
local teams coexist, i.e. some ￿rms trade but some ￿rms do not in line with stylized facts on
￿rm-level trade, while in the specialization equilibrium, all ￿rms engage in international trade.
In the following, I ￿rst analyze the incomplete specialization equilibrium and then, the complete
specialization equilibrium.
153.3 Incomplete Specialization Equilibrium
The incomplete specialization equilibrium is more complicated than the autarky equilibrium since
trade costs prevent some ￿rms from engaging in international trade. To distinguish suppliers who
can export from those who cannot, I introduce the concept of exportability.
De￿nition 1 Home Zi-suppliers with quality zi are called exportable if ￿Zi (zi) + fI = ￿￿
Zi (zi)
and non-exportable if ￿Zi (zi) + fI > ￿￿
Zi (zi). Similarly, Foreign Zi-suppliers with quality zi are
called exportable if ￿￿
Zi (zi) + fI = ￿Zi (zi) and non-exportable if ￿￿
Zi (zi) + fI > ￿Zi (zi).
When Home Zi-suppliers with quality zi are exportable, Foreign ￿nal producers are indi⁄erent
between Home Zi-suppliers with quality zi and Foreign Zi-suppliers with the same quality. When
Home Zi-suppliers with quality zi are non-exportable, Foreign ￿nal producers strictly prefer For-
eign Zi-suppliers with zi to Home Zi-suppliers with the same quality. Notice that non-exportable
Zi-suppliers never export, but exportable Zi-suppliers do not necessarily export. All Home Zi-
suppliers are classi￿ed as either exportable or non-exportable because ￿Zi (zi)+fI < ￿￿
Zi (zi) never
holds; otherwise, no ￿nal producer would choose Foreign Zi-suppliers with zi.
I prove two lemmas to derive the market clearing conditions in the matching market. I assume
that as in the autarky equilibrium, countries have more entrants in LEC sectors than HEC sectors,
MZ1e = M￿
Z2e > MZ2e = M￿
Z1e; (19)
and prove this inequality later at the end of this section. The ￿rst lemma shows that the quality
of exportable Zi-suppliers are equalized within a team.
Lemma 3 A Z1-supplier is matched with a Z2-supplier with the same quality if either one of
them is exportable.
Proof. In Appendix.
Lemma 3 is derived from the de￿nition of exportability and the mirror-image structure of
Home and Foreign. Suppose an exportable Home Z1-supplier with quality z is matched with a
Foreign Z2-supplier. Consider the case of international matching ￿rst. Since the pro￿t schedules
of Foreign Z2-suppliers is identical to that of Home Z1-suppliers and the joint pro￿t is symmetric
in the quality parameters of Z1-supplier and Z2-supplier, the partner Foreign Z2-supplier also has
the same quality z. A similar logic is applied for the case of local matching.
16Although Lemma 3 depends on the mirror-image assumption, it greatly saves notations. In
more general setting, a complete description of possible matching patterns requires eight func-
tions. However, from Lemma 3, four functions mZi (x) and m￿
Zi (x) can summarize an equilibrium
matching pattern. A Home ￿nal producer with quality x is matched with Zi-suppliers with qual-
ity mZi (x) regardless of the nationality of Zi-suppliers. Similarly, a Foreign ￿nal producer with
quality x is matched with Zi-suppliers with quality m￿
Zi (x). Notice that the assortative matching
continues to hold, i.e. mZi(x) ￿ mZi(x0) and m￿
Zi(x) ￿ m￿
Zi(x0) if and only if x ￿ x0, since team￿ s
joint pro￿t remains supermodular even with ￿xed trade costs.
The second lemma shows only high quality Zi-suppliers in LEC sectors are exportable.
Lemma 4 There exists a threshold quality zT such that only Home Z1-suppliers and Foreign
Z2-suppliers with higher quality than zT are exportable. The other suppliers are non-exportable.
Proof. In Appendix.
The intuition for Lemma 4 is simple. From inequality (19), international matching occurs
only between Home Z1-suppliers and Foreign Z2-suppliers, i.e ￿rms that are abundant in the two
countries. However, not all ￿rms can trade. Exportable suppliers must be high quality since low
quality teams cannot a⁄ord trade costs.20
Lemmas 3 and 4 derive three conditions for matching of ￿rms. First, since ￿nal producers
are indi⁄erent between domestic Zi-suppliers and foreign Zi-suppliers if they are higher quality
than zT, these high quality ￿rms in Home and Foreign are pooled together. The market clearing
condition for high quality ￿rm can be written as
(MXe + M￿
Xe)[1 ￿ G(x)] = (MZie + M￿
Zie)[1 ￿ G(mZi (xT))] for all x ￿ xT, (20)
where xT is de￿ned by zT = mZi (xT). Notice that mZ1 (x) = mZ2 (x) for all x ￿ xT from (19).
After the opening of trade, the cross-country di⁄erence in matching patterns that exists in autarky
disappears for high quality teams. For low quality teams that cannot form international teams,
the market clearing condition holds for local ￿rms,
MXe [G(xT) ￿ G(x)] = MZie [G(zT) ￿ G(mZi (x))] for all x 2 [xL;xT]: (21)
20Lemma 4 crucially depends on the assumption that the distribution of ￿rm size G is similar across sectors and
across countries. Once the model allows asymmetric distributions of ￿rms, it will be possible for the highest quality
suppliers to be non-exportable. I do not pursue the case of asymmetric distributions here since the shape of the
￿rm-size distribution is similar across industries and across countries in data.
17The pattern of international matching is derived from conditions (20), (21), and Lemma 4.
Since the mass of entrants of Zi-suppliers di⁄ers across countries, international matching must
occur between high quality ￿rms. Following a tradition in the literature, I focus on an equilibrium
that minimizes the amount of international matching.
Lemma 5 (i) Among ￿nal producers with given quality x ￿ xT, the share of ￿nal producers that
import intermediate goods is sX = MXe (MZ1e ￿ MZ2e)=(MZ1e + MZ2e) 2 (0;1). (ii)Among Zi-
suppliers in LEC sectors with given quality z ￿ zT, the share of Zi-suppliers exporting intermediate
goods is sZ = (MZ1e ￿ MZ2e)=2 2 (0;1).
Lemma 5 shows that only high quality ￿nal producers import and only high quality Zi-suppliers
in LEC sectors export, though not all of them trade. Figure 5 describes the market clearing
conditions (20) and (21). The area of each of six rectangles surrounded by solid lines is the mass of
survival ￿rms in each sector. Trade costs divide ￿rms into three groups and ￿rms are assortatively
matched among each group. High quality ￿rms in grey area are matched together and low quality
￿rms in each stripe area are matched together. Firms that trade are expressed by the shaded area
in Figure 6. Home ￿nal producers in area A are matched with Foreign Z2-suppliers in area A￿ ;
Foreign ￿nal producers in area B are matched with Home Z1-suppliers in area B￿ .
3.3.1 New Predictions on Firm-level Trade
The model provides new predications on the observable characteristics of trading ￿rms, some of
which are observed in empirical studies. Before stating them, I explain how quality parameters
link several observable characteristics of ￿rms. Unit price is a proxy for product quality. This is
clear for ￿nal goods from (3). A unit price of an intermediate good Zi, pZi (zi), is obtained by
dividing the revenue by output,
pZi (zi) ￿
￿Zi (zi) + LZi (q (zi);￿ c)
￿ c







Since the output ￿ c is common for all teams and q is increasing in zi, a unit price is positively
correlated with product quality. From (3), the assortative matching implies that product quality
is positively correlated with revenue, employment, pro￿t, and unit prices in each sector.
Trade patterns in the incomplete specialization equilibrium o⁄er three predictions on charac-
teristics of trading ￿rms.
18Proposition 1 (1) Firms trade with those with similar characteristics such as revenue, employ-
ment, pro￿t, and unit prices. (2) When the type of sectors and the nationality of ￿rms are con-
trolled, the average exporter is larger than the average non-exporter and the average importer is
larger than the average non-importer in such common variables as employment, revenue, pro￿t,
and unit prices. (3) However, there exist ￿rms that are larger in employment, revenue, pro￿t, and
unit prices than other trading ￿rms but choose not to trade.
Three predictions in Proposition 1 have not been presented in the previous models of hetero-
geneous ￿rm trade theories. First, in contrast to standard models of heterogeneous ￿rms based
on the love of variety such as Melitz (2003) and Kasahara and Lapham (2007), which predicts all
exporters trade with all importers, in the current model, high quality exporters selectively trade
only with high quality importers, while low quality exporters selectively trade only with low quality
importers. This international assortative matching is consistent with many anecdotal stories on
the production of high quality goods, e.g. Boeing 787 and Apple ipod, although to my knowledge,
no systematic econometric study has tested whether the assortative matching is a chief trading
pattern in data yet.
Second, Proposition 1 is the ￿rst demonstration of the concentration of exporting and importing
into large and high quality ￿rms in a single framework. Recent empirical studies report that
exports and imports are concentrated into a small share of ￿rms within an industry and that
on average, exporting ￿rms and importing ￿rms are larger than non-trading ￿rms in common
characteristics such as employment, sales, productivity, wage, capital intensity, and skill intensity.21
Although many papers have been written on these styled facts, none of them treated heterogeneous
exporters and heterogeneous importers within one framework. The assortative matching in this
model naturally explains the similarity of characteristics of exporting ￿rms and importing ￿rms.
Finally, the large size and the high quality are necessary conditions for trade, but not su¢ cient
conditions. While the standard love of variety models predicts ￿rms that are larger than a certain
threshold always choose to trade, in data, the correlation between ￿rm size (or measured produc-
tivity) and ￿rm￿ s trading status is obviously not perfect (see e.g. Bernard et al. 2003), i.e. there
are many large ￿rms that do not trade.22 The current model predicts the existence of non-trading
21Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) observed that better performances of export-
ing ￿rms re￿ ect their intrinsic ability.
22In Bernard et al. (2003), the most productive ￿rms do not necessarily export since high productivity does
19large ￿rms without relying on any idiosyncratic factor.
Before moving to the analysis on the change of the quality in the next subsection, I list equi-
librium conditions for obtaining endogenous variables and prove the inequality (19). From Lemma
4, fI = ￿Z2 (mZ2 (x)) ￿ ￿Z1 (mZ1 (x)) holds if and only if x ￿ xT. Therefore, the threshold xT is
determined by











where pro￿t schedules are solved from (9), (12), and (21). Finally, the mass of entrants are solved
from the free entry conditions (14) and the average revenue M￿ r = ￿ L. The inequality (19) follows
from the free entry conditions and the inequality of ￿xed entry costs (18).
Lemma 6 MZ1e = M￿
Z2e > MZ2e = M￿
Z1e.
Proof. In Appendix.
3.4 Quality Upgrading of Final Goods
Trade liberalization a⁄ects the quality of ￿nal goods by changing matching patterns. I analyze
the change of ￿nal good quality by comparing the autarky equilibrium and the trade equilibrium.
Following Proposition 5, I divide ￿nal producers by quality at threshold xT. I ￿rst consider the
quality change of high quality ￿nal producers and, then, that of low quality ￿nal producers.
Quality Upgrading of High Quality Firms The opening of trade a⁄ects the matching market
in two ways. First, high quality ￿rms in Home and Foreign are pooled together. Second, ￿rms
enter and exit under free entry. To separate the former e⁄ect from the latter one, I decompose
trade liberalization into short run and long run: in the short run, international matching is allowed,
with the mass of entrants kept at the autarky level; in the long run, the mass of entrants adjusts
to satisfy the free entry conditions.
not necessarily implies the comparative advantage as in a traditional Ricardian model. In their model, there is no
heterogeneity in importers.
20Short Run E⁄ect Trade improves the quality of ￿nal goods even in the short run. All
propositions and lemmas in the last section holds in the short run equilibrium, though the mass of
entrants should be at the autarky level there, since they are derived from the inequality (19) and
do not depend on the levels of the mass of entrants. I obtain assignment functions ms
Zi (x) from
the market clearing condition (20),
ms
Z1 (x) = ms








for x ￿ xT: (22)
The assignment functions (22) are comparable with those in the autarky equilibrium (11) since
they are commonly expressed in terms of the relative mass of entrants into the Zi-sector and
the ￿nal goods sector. Figure 7, which replicates Figure 2, draws assignment functions (11)









concave curve implies that ms
Zi(x) is higher than the average of ma
Z1 (x) and m￿a
Z1 (x). By the
quasi-concavity of q, a ￿nal producer with quality x ￿ ^ x raises the product quality. This is shown
in Figure 8, which draws ms
Z (x) (Point B) and ma
Zi (x) and m￿a
Zi (x) (Point A and Point A*) with
iso-q (x) curves.
The source of this short run quality upgrading is the reduction in the di⁄erence in the quality
of Zi-suppliers within a team. The competition with foreign ￿nal producers forces a ￿nal producer
to be matched with a lower quality Zi-supplier in LEC sector. However, trade also allows it to be
matched with a higher quality Zj-supplier in HEC sector than in the autarky. Since consumers
prefer a moderate combination of the quality of components, the latter positive e⁄ect compensates
for the former negative e⁄ect and improves the overall quality.
Long Run E⁄ect In the long run, the mass of entrants are adjusted to satisfy the free entry
conditions.
Lemma 7 (1)The mass of entrants of ￿nal producers remains at the autarky level: MXe =
Ma




Z2e > MZ2e: (23)
21(3)The relative mass of entrants of Zi-suppliers to ￿nal producers in the world increases but is

















Trade liberalization invites more entrants in LEC sectors and reduces entrants in HEC sectors.
This specialization of entry into sectors with low entry costs results in the increase in the mass
of entrants of Zi-suppliers in the world. This specialization of R&D investment in more e¢ cient
sectors reminiscent a classical Ricardian comparative advantage.
The long run adjustment of ￿rms￿entry and exit further improves the quality of ￿nal goods.
From (20), the assignment function in the long run is






x for x ￿ xT: (25)
From Figure 7, ￿nal producers become matched with higher quality Zi-suppliers than in the short
run equilibrium, i.e. mZi (x) > ms
Zi (x). Point C in Figure 8 expresses mZi (x) on a iso-quality
curve q (x) = ql (x), where ql (x) is the quality of ￿nal good produced by a ￿nal producer with
quality x in the trade equilibrium. From (24) and (25), the upper bound of mZi(x) is ma
Z1 (x) =
m￿a
Z2 (x). Therefore, Point C is located somewhere between Point B and Point D.
The source of the long run quality upgrading could be interpreted as increased competition
among Zi-suppliers. Countries￿specialization in LEC sectors increases the mass of entrants of
Zi-suppliers in the world. The intensi￿ed competition among Zi-suppliers allows ￿nal producers
to be matched with higher quality Zi-suppliers.
In sum, trade liberalization improves the quality of high quality ￿nal goods in two steps. While
trade eliminates the quality gap between Zi-suppliers in the short-run, trade increases the quality
level of Zi-suppliers matched with a given ￿nal producer in the long-run.
Let ￿(x) ￿ ql (x)=qa (x) be the degree of quality-change of a ￿nal producer with x. It is
straight forward to show the quality upgrading is at a constant rate.
Proposition 2 ￿(x) = K > 1 for x ￿ xT, where K = (MZ1e + MZ2e)
2k =(MZ1eMZ2e)
k.
Finally, I should remark the quality upgrading does not require the use of imported intermediate
goods. High quality ￿nal producers equally gain from the opening of trade whether they are
22matched with foreign suppliers or not. I will show this property distinguishes the current model
from the conventional models later below.
Quality Upgrading of Low Quality Firms Final producers with lower quality than xT cannot



















for x 2 [xL;xT). If x is close to xT, then mZi (x) in (26) is close to the value predicted by (20).
As x becomes smaller, the di⁄erence between (26) and (20) becomes wider. Therefore, the degree
of quality-upgrading is increasing in x.
Proposition 3 (i) ￿(xT) < K and ￿0 (x) > 0 for x 2 [xL;xT). (ii) ￿(xa
L) > 1 if MZie=MXe are




Surprisingly, even ￿nal producers whose quality is too low to be matched with foreign suppliers
can upgrade the product quality. The intuition is simple. After the opening of trade, the in￿ ow of
high quality Z2-suppliers from Foreign makes high quality ￿nal producers to release high quality
Z2-suppliers for low quality ￿nal producers in Home. Furthermore, it is possible for all ￿nal
producers with x ￿ xa
L to upgrade product quality if the mass of entrants is close to the autarky
level. However, another opposing e⁄ect arises in the long run. The specialization into Z1-sectors
from Z2-sectors reduces the mass of entrants of Z2-suppliers in Home. Whether all ￿nal producers
upgrade the product quality is generally ambiguous.
3.4.1 Testable predictions of the Model against the Conventional Models
The model presents the new mechanism of gains from trade in intermediate goods. However, it
is not the only model demonstrating the positive e⁄ect of trade in intermediate goods on the
performance of ￿nal producers. Trade in intermediate goods improves the productivity/quality in
the conventional models such as the love of variety model, e.g. Ethier (1982), and the quality ladder
model, e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1991). Of course, an ideal empirical test on the current model
against these conventional models is to check the assortative matching of trading ￿rms. However,
at this moment, it is very di¢ cult to link transaction data with ￿rms￿characteristics data in
23multiple countries to see characteristics of exporters and importers at transaction level. Therefore,
in this section, I propose an alternative form of empirical test of the current model against the
conventional models that is relatively easier to implement.
The prediction on the relationship between the degree of quality-upgrading and the importing
status of ￿nal producers provides a basis distinguishing the current model from the conventional
models.
Remark 1 After trade liberalization of intermediate goods, (i) the average degree of quality-
upgrading of ￿rms that use imported intermediate goods (importing ￿rms) is larger than that of
￿rms that do not (non-importing ￿rms). (ii) The average degree of quality-upgrading of non-
importing ￿rms can be positive.
To test the current model against these models, it is su¢ cient to check whether Remark 1 hold
in data. In the conventional models, a necessary condition for improving the productivity/quality
is to import intermediate goods. Therefore, the prediction (ii) of Remark 1 should not be observed
in these models.
To my knowledge, there is no econometric study that investigates the e⁄ect of trade liberal-
ization of intermediate goods on the quality of ￿nal goods.23 To my knowledge, a recent study by
Amiti and Konings (2007) on Indonesian plants is the closest. The authors estimate the e⁄ect of
a reduction in tari⁄s on intermediate goods on the total factor productivity (TFP) of importing
￿rms and non-importing ￿rms instead of product quality.
Their ￿ndings are consistent with Remark 1. Non-importing ￿rms improve TFPs though
importing ￿rms experience a larger improvement more than non-importing ￿rms. Their ￿nding
was puzzling in the conventional love of variety model or the quality ladder model unless there
exists some externality between importing ￿rms and non-importing ￿rms as the authors suggest.
However, it is totally plausible in the current model. There are at least two remarks on using
Amiti and Konings (2007) as an test for Remark 1. First, Indonesia is not a developed country
which the current model mainly considers. Indonesian manufacturing sector can be regarded as
a part of regional production chains among East and Southeast Asian countries, many of which
are developing countries. Therefore, it is likely that trade liberalization may have increased trade
23Verhoogen (2008) investigates the e⁄ect of trade liberalization with respect to ￿nal goods on the quality of ￿nal
goods in Mexico.
24in intermediate goods with those developing countries. Second, instead of product quality, the
authors estimate TFP without controlling product quality. Since it is known that the measured
TFP may re￿ ect the quality of output as well as true TFP, the change in measured TFP might
re￿ ect the change in product quality (Katayama, Lu, and Tybout, 2006; Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson, 2008).24
3.5 The Lowest Quality Thresholds and the Mass of Consumption Varieties
Finally, I analyze the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the levels of the lowest quality thresholds
and the mass of consumption varieties. Consistent with Melitz (2003) and Kasahara and Lapham
(2008), trade liberalization raises the lowest quality thresholds both in exporting sectors and in
importing sectors and reduces the mass of survival teams, i.e. the mass of consumption varieties.
Proposition 4 (i)The lowest quality thresholds of ￿nal producers and Zi-suppliers in LEC sectors
rise, i.e. xL 2 (xa
L;xT) and z1L = z￿
2L 2 (za
1L;zT). The lowest quality thresholds of Zi-suppliers in
HEC sectors fall. (ii) The mass of consumption varieties falls.
Proof. In Appendix.
Since high quality ￿nal producers upgrade the quality of ￿nal goods at a higher rate than low
quality ￿nal producers, low quality ￿nal producers must exit from the market, even though they
might upgrade the product quality. Therefore, the mass of consumption varieties falls. On the
other hand, the mass of Zi-suppliers increases in LEC sectors and decreases in HEC sectors from
Lemma 7. Therefore, the lowest quality threshold of Zi-suppliers rises in LEC sectors and falls in
HEC sectors.25
24It is possible to show Remark 1 can be applied for a coarse measure of team￿ s productivity, revenue per worker
(revenue TFP) RTFP(x) ￿ r(q (x))=[￿ cq (x) + f]. Alternatively, the quality parameters x, z1, and z2 can be
interpreted as productivity in such a model where teams produce symmetric goods in a Cobb-Douglass production
technology.
25From Proposition 3, it is possible that even ￿nal producers that upgrade the ￿nal good must exit since the degree
of their quality upgrading is smaller than that of high quality ￿rms. Therefore, some might think that the quality
upgrading of ￿rms that cannot import is not important if they cannot survive. However, notice that Proposition 4
heavily depends on the assumption that the total expenditure on ￿nal goods is constant. If the quality upgrading
expands the total expenditure, e.g. in a multi-industry setting, it would be possible that all ￿nal producers upgrading
the product quality can survive after trade liberalization.
253.6 Complete Specialization Equilibrium
When fI is su¢ ciently small, countries specialize in the ￿nal good sector and the LEC sector.
All teams are international teams. Because of the symmetry of Home and Foreign, Home ￿nal
producers are matched with a half of Home Z1-suppliers and a half of Foreign Z2-suppliers. The
world economy is equivalent with a closed economy with 2￿ L of labor endowment, common entry
costs fZ1e both in Z1-sector and in Z2-sector, and production ￿xed costs fI +f instead of f. The
assignment functions are






x for x ￿ xL. (27)
Point D in Figure 9 expresses mZi (x) with iso-quality curve of ￿ q(x). Points A, A*, and C are
those for the Home autarky equilibrium, the Foreign autarky equilibrium, and the incomplete
specialization equilibrium in Figure 8. The quality of ￿nal goods produced by a ￿nal producer with
given quality is higher than in an incomplete specialization equilibrium. Since (27) is independent
of fI, trade liberalization does not a⁄ect the quality of ￿nal goods. The mass of entrants of ￿nal
producers and Zi-suppliers are the same as the autarky, which are also independent of fI. The


















Therefore, trade liberalization increases the mass of consumption varieties, by lowering the lowest
quality thresholds.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a new mechanism of quality-upgrading in a tractable general equilibrium
model of matching of ￿rms heterogeneous in product quality. Trade in intermediate goods between
developed countries raises the quality of ￿nal goods by improving matching of ￿rms in a production
process. The quality upgrading arises both from the short-run e⁄ect of convergence in the matching
of ￿rms and from the long-run competition e⁄ect of specialization. The model provides a number
of plausible predictions on ￿rm-level trade in contrast to the previous model of heterogeneous ￿rm
models. Firms selectively trade with those with similar characteristics. Trade costs concentrate
both exporting and importing into a small portion of large ￿rms producing high quality products,
26though some portion of large and high quality ￿rms always choose not to trade. Trade upgrades
the quality of ￿nal producers that do not use imported intermediate goods, which is supported by
an empirical study by Amiti and Konings (2007).
The model presented in the paper is highly simpli￿ed. I remark on some extensions. The
current model abstracts away from several frictions in matching, especially search frictions and
incompleteness of contracts. One way to incorporate search frictions is to introduce a dynamic
search process into multi-sided matching a la Shimer and Smith (2000). In such setting, the
authors con￿rm the assortative matching holds on average but with some frictional deviations.
Since the main predictions in the current paper are derived from the assortative matching result, an
introduction of search frictions will make the model quantitatively more realistic with maintaining
the qualitative predictions. Second, the hold up problem due to incomplete contracts a⁄ects
team￿ s choice on the organizational form, i.e. FDI or arm￿ s length. An introduction of contract
costs will allow us to examine the interaction between matching of heterogeneous ￿rms and ￿rm￿ s
boundaries.
Throughout this paper, ￿rms trade with relationship-speci￿c inputs under nonlinear pricing.
An alternative model of quality-di⁄erentiated goods might be a market-based model with linear
pricing, in which suppliers announce the price and quality of intermediate goods and wait for ￿nal
producers to come and buy them. The market-based model may be realistic for standardized
intermediate goods, e.g. steal. Under the imperfect competition, even the best supplier does not
usually take all of the market in order to raise a price; therefore, such model will again see a
matching problem between suppliers and ￿nal producers. Whether the mechanism of international
matching found in this paper continue to exist is an interesting question for future research.
Finally, empirical studies on international matching are necessary. To construct an ideal data
set to directly test assortative matching, one needs to match customs transaction data with data
on characteristics of exporters and importers in at least two countries. Although international
matching of ￿rm-level data is currently very di¢ cult, I believe that it will greatly improve our
understanding of ￿rms￿trade.
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5 Appendix
Proof for Lemma 1 Without loss of generality, it is su¢ cient to show that neither of the
following two cases holds: (i) there exist x and x0 such that x > x0, mZ1 (x) > mZ1 (x0); and
mZ2 (x0) > mZ2 (x); (ii) there exist x and x0 such that x > x0, mZ1 (x0) > mZ1 (x), and mZ2 (x0) >
mZ2 (x).
(i) Suppose x > x0 and mZ1 (x) > mZ1 (x0). By de￿nition of mZi (x) and ￿X (x), it follows
that





































￿ ￿Z2 (mZ2 (x)): (29)
By adding (28) to (29), I obtain















xmZ1 (x) ￿ x0mZ1
￿
x0￿￿￿




The inequality (30) implies mZ2 (x) ￿ mZ2 (x0).
(ii) Suppose x > x0 and mZ1 (x0) > mZ1 (x). By de￿nition of mZi (x) and ￿X (x), it follows
that





































￿ Ax0mZ1 (x)mZ2 (x) ￿ f ￿ ￿Z1 (mZ1 (x)) ￿ ￿Z2 (mZ2 (x)) (32)
32By adding (31) to (32), I obtain




























The inequality (30) implies mZ2 (x) ￿ mZ2 (x0). Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 2 (i) Suppose the two countries are in autarky for some ￿nite fI. Since
￿￿a
Z1 (z)￿￿a










1L hold from (13) and (16), there must
be some z0 such that ￿￿
Z1 (z0) > ￿Z1 (z0) + fI. Then, ￿nal producers and Z2-suppliers in Foreign
prefer Home Z1-suppliers with quality z0 to Foreign Z1-suppliers with the same quality. Therefore,
the autarky matching is unstable for any ￿nite fI.
(ii) Suppose the two countries have positive mass of entrants in ￿nal good sectors and in LEC
sectors, but no entrant in HEC sectors. I show that when very small mass of Home Z2-suppliers
enter, their expected pro￿ts must exceed entry costs when fI is su¢ ciently large. Suppose that the
mass of the new entrants is so small that it does not change matching pattern. If the new Home
Z2-suppliers draw z2 > z￿
2L(= z1L), then trade costs allow them to earns ￿Z2 (z2) = ￿￿
Z2 (z2)+fI =
￿Z1 (z2) + fI:
Notice that the allocation in a complete specialization equilibrium with fI is equivalent with
the one in the free trade equilibrium in which ￿xed cost f is replaced with f + fI since all teams









fZ1e (k ￿ 3)
￿1=k











￿Z2 (z2) = ￿Z1 (z2)+fI =
z3
2 (f + fI)






if z2 2 [z1L;1). (35)
On the other hand, when the new Home Z2-suppliers draw z0
2 < z1L, they receive approximately
all of the joint pro￿t by forming teams with ￿nal producers with xL ￿ ￿x and Z1-suppliers with
















33I used the cuto⁄ condition (8) to obtain (36). From AxLz1Lz￿
2L = f +fI, z￿








(k￿1)=k [fZ1e (k ￿ 3)]
1=k: (37)
Since z2L decreases in fI from (37) and ￿Z2 (z2) increases in fI for all z2 ￿ z2L from (35) and
(36), [1 ￿ G(z2L)]￿ ￿Z2 =
R 1
z2L ￿Z2 (z)g(z)dz is increasing in fI. Therefore, for su¢ ciently high fI,
the expected pro￿t of Z2-suppliers must be strictly positive so that countries must produce both
intermediate goods. Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 3 It is su¢ cient to consider two cases. Case (i): an exportable Home Zi-
supplier with quality zi is matched with a Foreign ￿nal producer with x and a Foreign Zj-supplier
with zj. Suppose zi 6= zj. From the mirror-image structure of Home and Foreign, ￿Zi (z) = ￿￿
Zj (z)
for all z. Therefore, the Foreign ￿nal producer earns
￿￿
X (x) = Axzizj ￿ ￿Zi (zi) ￿ ￿￿
Zj (zj) ￿ fI ￿ f
= Axzizj ￿ ￿￿
Zj (zi) ￿ ￿￿



















￿ fI ￿ f:
Since the second order condition for maximization requires ￿￿00
Zj (z) > 0, ￿ z ￿ (zi + zj)=2 satis￿es
Axzizj ￿ ￿￿
Zj (zi) ￿ ￿￿
Zj (zj) ￿ fI < Ax(￿ z)
2 ￿ 2￿￿
Zj (￿ z) ￿ f ￿ fI
= Ax(￿ z)
2 ￿ ￿Zi (￿ z) ￿ ￿￿
Zj (￿ z) ￿ f ￿ fI:
The inequality implies that the Home ￿nal producer with x forms a new team with a Home
Zi-supplier with ￿ z and Foreign Zj-supplier with ￿ z, which contradicts with stable matching.
Case (ii): an exportable Home Zi-supplier with quality zi is matched with a Home ￿nal
producer with x and a Home Zj-supplier with zj. Suppose zi 6= zj. From the mirror-image
structure, Foreign Zj-suppliers with quality zi are also exportable. Since ￿Zi (z) = ￿￿
Zj (z) holds
for all z, the Home ￿nal producer earns
￿X (x) = Axzizj ￿ ￿Zi (zi) ￿ ￿Zj (zj) ￿ f
= Axzizj ￿ ￿Zi (zi) ￿ ￿￿
Zj (zj) ￿ f ￿ fI
= Axzizj ￿ ￿￿
Zj (zi) ￿ ￿￿



















￿ fI ￿ f:
34From the second order condition ￿￿00
Zj (z) > 0, ￿ z ￿ (zi + zj)=2 satis￿es
Axzizj ￿ ￿￿
Zj (zi) ￿ ￿￿
Zj (zj) ￿ fI < Ax(￿ z)
2 ￿ 2￿￿
Zj (￿ z) ￿ f ￿ fI
= Ax(￿ z)
2 ￿ ￿Zi (￿ z) ￿ ￿￿
Zj (￿ z) ￿ f ￿ fI:
The inequality implies that the Home ￿nal producer with x forms a new team with a Home Zi-
supplier with ￿ z and Foreign Zj-supplier with ￿ z, which contradicts with stable matching. Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 4 The proof consists of Claims 1 to 3.
Claim 1 Home Z2-suppliers and Foreign Z1-suppliers are non-exportable.
Proof. Suppose Home Zi-suppliers with quality z are exportable. Under the assortative matching,











Zi (zi) is the share of Home Zi-suppliers with quality zi choosing domestic partners. By
de￿nition, ￿D
Zi (zi) < 1 holds only when Home Zi-suppliers with quality zi are exportable. A
di⁄erentiation of (38) with respect to z leads to
MZ1e￿D
Z1 (z) = MZ2e￿D
Z2 (z): (39)
Notice that if Home Zi-suppliers with quality z are exportable, ￿￿
Zi (z) = ￿Zi (z)￿fI, then Home
Zj-suppliers with quality z are non-exportable since under the mirror-image structure, it follows
that ￿Zj (z) = ￿￿
Zj (z) ￿ fI. Therefore, only one of ￿D
Z1 (z) or ￿D
Z2 (z) can be smaller than unity.
From MZ1e > MZ2e, only a combination of ￿D
Z2 (z) = 1 and ￿D
Z1 (z) = MZ2e=MZ1e < 1 satis￿es
condition (39). Therefore, Home Z2-suppliers are all non-exportable. Q.E.D.
Claim 2 mZ1 (x) ￿ mZ2 (x) for all x ￿ xL.
Proof. Since ￿D





Z1 (t)g(t)dt = MZ2e[1 ￿ G(mZ2 (x))] for all x ￿ xL.











g(t)dt = G(mZ1 (x)) ￿ G(mZ2 (x)) for all x ￿ xL. (40)
Since ￿D
Z1 (z) ￿ MZ2e=MZ1e for all x ￿ xL from the proof for Claim 1, the left hand side of (40) is
non-negative for all x ￿ xL. Q.E.D.
35Claim 3 (i) ￿￿
Z1 (z)￿￿Z1 (z) = ￿Z2 (z)￿￿￿
Z2 (z) = fI for all z ￿ zT. (ii) 0 ￿ ￿￿
Z1 (z)￿￿Z1 (z) =
￿Z2 (z) ￿ ￿￿
Z2 (z) < fI for all z 2 [z￿
1L;zT).
Proof. (i) Consider two teams with bundles of quality parameters, (x;z1;z2) and (x0;z0
1;z0
2),
respectively. Suppose z2 = z0
1 (￿ ^ z). Claim 2 implies that x ￿ x0 and z1 ￿ z2 = z0
1 ￿ z0
2.
Therefore, from the ￿rst order condition, we obtain
￿0
Z2 (^ z) = Axz1 ￿ ￿0
Z1 (^ z) = Ax0z0
2. (41)
In a complete specialization equilibrium, there exists some exportable Home Z1-supplier with
quality ~ z ￿ zL such that ￿￿
Z1 (~ z) ￿ ￿Z1 (~ z) = fI. Suppose there exists z > ~ z such that ￿￿
Z1 (z) ￿
￿Z1 (z) < fI on the contrary. Since ￿￿
Z1 (z) = ￿Z2 (z) holds in equilibrium, the di⁄erence in the
pro￿t schedules satis￿es
￿￿









The second term in the right hand side must be non-negative from (41), which it contradicts with
￿￿
Z1 (z) ￿ ￿Z1 (z) < fI. Therefore, if ￿￿
Z1 (z0) ￿ ￿Z1 (z0) = fI holds for some z0, then ￿￿
Z1 (z) ￿
￿Z1 (z) = fI holds for all z ￿ z0. (ii) Since z2L = z￿
1L < z1L = z￿
2L from MZ2e > MZ1e, the
di⁄erence in the pro￿t schedules is
￿￿







Z2 (u) ￿ ￿0
Z1 (u)
￿
du for all z 2 [z1L;zT). (42)
From (41), ￿￿
Z1 (z) ￿ ￿Z1 (z) 2 [0;fI) for z 2 [z￿
1L;zT). Q.E.D.
Finally, I prove LEC sectors have more entrants than HEC sectors. Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 6 Suppose MZ1e = M￿
Z2e < MZ2e = MZ1e, on the contrary. Then, from
similar arguments in Claims 1 to 3, it is possible to show mZ2 (x) ￿ mZ1 (x) for x ￿ xL; ￿0
Z1 (z) =
￿0
Z2 (z) for z ￿ zT and ￿0
Z1 (z) ￿ ￿0
Z2 (z) for z < zT.
From integration by parts, the free entry condition becomes








Zi (t)[1 ￿ G(t)]du:
Since ￿0
Z1 (z) = ￿0
Z2 (z) for z ￿ zT, the di⁄erence in the free entry conditions is








Z1 (t)[1 ￿ G(t)]dt > 0.
Since ￿0
Z1 (z) ￿ ￿0
Z2 (z) for z < zT, it requires z1L > z2L, which contradicts with mZ2 (x) ￿ mZ1 (x)
for x ￿ xL. Q.E.D.
36Proof for Lemma 7 (1) From k[1 ￿ G(x)] = xg(x) and the integration by parts, the free entry






















(2)(3)The proof for (2) and (3) consists of Claims 4 to 6.
Claim 4 Let ￿Zi (x) ￿ xm0
Zi (x)=mZi (x). Then, it follows that
￿Zi (x) = 1 for x > xT and ￿Zi (x) =
MXe [1 ￿ G(x)]
MZie [1 ￿ G(mZi (x))]
:
























for x 2 [xL;xT]:









MXe [1 ￿ G(x)]
MZie [1 ￿ G(mZi (x))]
for x 2 [xL;xT]: (43)

























mZ1 (t)mZ2 (t)[1 ￿ G(t)]dt: (45)















mZ1 (t)mZ2 (t)[1 ￿ G(t)]dt: (46)
Since 2MXe [1 ￿ G(x)] =
P



























Proof. From fZ1e=fXe = Ma
Xe=Ma

















mZ1 (t)mZ2 (t)[1 ￿ G(t)]dt (47)
Since ma
Z1 (x) > mZ1 (x) for x ￿ xT, the comparison of (46) and (47) proves that MZ1e=MXe >
Ma
Z1e=Ma
Xe. From (44), we also obtain Ma
Z2e=Ma
Xe > MZ2e=MXe.


























Xe, K > 1 holds. Q.E.D.








































if x ￿ xT.





























































L) = qt (xa
L). Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 4 Let ￿ ￿X (xL) be the average pro￿t of ￿nal producers when the lowest





























From the cuto⁄ condition (31), it follows that



































































Therefore, there exists xL 2 (xa
L;xT) such that ￿ ￿X (xL) = fXe [1 ￿ G(xL)]
￿1.
It takes similar steps to prove z1L 2 (za
1L;zT). The average pro￿t of Home Z1-suppliers when
the lowest quality threshold is z1L, ￿ ￿Z1 (z1L); is





















































Z1 (￿) is an inverse function of mZ1 (￿). From assignment functions (25) and (26), it follows











































Therefore, there exists z1L 2 (za
1L;zT) such that ￿ ￿Z1 (z1L) = fZ1e [1 ￿ G(z1L)]
￿1.
Finally,



























































































if z2L ￿ za
2L.
Therefore, z2L < za
2L must hold.
(ii) The average revenue of teams is ￿ r = ￿ (￿ ￿X + ￿ ￿Z1 + ￿ ￿Z2 + f + fI(MI=M)), where MI is
the mass of international teams. Since ￿ ￿Z1 + ￿ ￿Z2 = 2￿ ￿X holds both in the autarky and in the






￿ (3￿ ￿X + f + fI(MI=M))
:
From the proof for (i) of this Lemma, ￿ ￿X is higher than the autarky level. Therefore, M < Ma.
Q.E.D.
40Figure 1: Matching market equilibrium. The vertical axis expresses the share of ￿rms whose
quality is lower than a certatin level. The mass of the survival ￿rms MXe [1 ￿ G(xL)] and
MZie [1 ￿ G(ziL)] , which are the areas of rectangles surounded by solid lines must be equal-
ized. Firms with lower quality than the thresholds xL, z1L, and z2L exit from the market. The
assortative matching implies for all x ￿ xL, the mass of ￿nal producers with higher quality than x,
which is the area of the left grey rectangle, must be equal to the mass of Zi-suppliers with higher





Figure 2: The quality of Zi-supplier matched with a ￿nal producer with quality x, mZi (x), is
increasing and concave in the relative mass of entrants into Zi-sector and ￿nal goods sector,
MZie=MXe.
42Figure 3: As the mass of entrants into Zi-sector and ￿nal goods sector, MZie, increases, a ￿nal
producer with quality x becomes matched with higher quality of Zi-supplier with mZi (x) though














Figure 4: Autarky matching: The curve depicts a combination of the quality of Zi-suppliers in
teams that produces ￿nal goods of quality qa (x) with a ￿nal producer with quality x. Point A and
Point A* expresse the quality of Zi-suppliers in Home autarky teams (mA
Z1 (x);mA
Z2 (x)) and in
Foreign autarky teams (mA￿
Z1 (x);mA￿
Z2 (x)), respectively. In each team, a Zi-supplier in low entry
cost sector has higher quality than the other Zj-supplier within the same team.
44Figure 5: Fixed trade costs separate ￿rms into three groups: high quality ￿rms in Home and
Foreign, which are expressed in grey areas, are matched together; low quality ￿rms in each country,
which are expressed in the same stripe areas, are matched locally.
45Figure 6: Equilibrium trade patterns. Home ￿nal producers in area A import from Foreign Z2-





































Figure 7: The quality of Z1-suppliers matched with high quality ￿nal producers with x ￿ xT is
higher than the average of those in two countries in the autarky. In the short run equilibrium,
the relative mass of entrants into Z1-sector to ￿nal producers, (Ma
Z1e + M￿a
Z1e)=2Ma
Xe, is the av-




Xe. The quality of Z1-suppliers matched
with ￿nal producers with quality x, ms
Z1 (x), is higher than the average of the two autarky lev-
els, ma
Z1 (x) and ma￿
Z1 (x). In the long run, the relative mass of Z1-suppliers to ￿nal producer,
(MZ1e + M￿
Z1e)=2MXe, increases so that mZ1 (x) rises further.
47Figure 8: After the opening of trade, high quality ￿nal producers with quality x ￿ xT upgrade the
quality of ￿nal goods both in the short run, from qa (x) to qs (x), and in the long run, from qs (x)
to ql (x). In the short run, ￿nal producers change Zi-suppliers with ma
Zi (x) to those with ms
Z (x);
in the long run, ￿nal producers change Zi-suppliers with ms
Zi (x) to those with mZ (x).
48Figure 9: In a complete specialization equilibrium, a ￿nal producer with quality x is matched with
Zi-suppliers with quality ma
Z1 (x) = ma
Z2 (x) expressed by Point D. The quality of ￿nal good ￿ q (x)
is higher than the level in the incomplete specialization equilibrium.
49